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Editorial 
Tax Policy: The Chafee Bill-
Trick or Treat? 
For all of the attention to the balanced-budget 
morality play, a Revenue Reconciliation Act tax provi-
sion of immense interest to the conservation commu-
nity has gone virtually unnoticed. It deserves to be 
skeptically noticed and rejected as wretched tax policy. 
Section 12303 of the Senate version of the Act 
would create a new exclusion for estate tax purposes, 
permitting an executor to elect to diminish the 
decedent's gross estate by up to 50% of the value of 
land subject to a "qualified conservation easement." In 
order to achieve the maximum 50% exclusion, the 
conservation easement value would have to equal at 
least 30% of the value of the land (as appraised without 
re!wrd to the easement), and the exclusion could not 
ap;ly to the value of any "development right" retained 
upon the creation of the easement. ("Development 
right" is vaguely defined with reference to "any com-
mercial purpose," not including, however, activities 
relatin£ to farmim!.) The value of land with respect to 
which ~he exclusi(~n could be computed is capped at $5 
million, reduced by the value of certain "qualified 
family-owned business interests" (another new exclu-
sionary provision of the Senate bill). Thus, the maxi-
mum estate tax exclusion achievable under this pro-
posal would be $2.5 million (for a tax saving of 
$1,375,000 at the maximum 55£k estate tax rate). 
There are geographical conditions: land subject to 
a "qualified conservation easement" must be "located 
in or within 25 miles" of a "metropolitan area" (as 
defined by the Office of Management and Budget), or 
"a national park or wilderness area designated as part 
of the National Wilderness Preservation System," un-
less the Secretary determines that such land is not 
under "significant development pressure." (The refer-
ence to "Secretary" presumably means the Secretary of 
the Treasury, acting through the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice - an agency not noted for its sophistication in 
determining the immediacy of environmental threats 
from development pressures.) There are a few other 
technical warts on the proposed new statute, but the 
foregoing capsule description will suffice as a primer. 
This proposal is a slightly more sophisticated it-
eration of a bill that Sen. John Chafee (R-RI) has been 
lugging around like a dead fish in newspaper for two or 
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the newsletter of land conservation lalv 
three years. If unwrapped by itself, and subjected to 
the proverbial olfactory test, it would surely empty 
even the Senate Finance Committee chambers. In an 
era where virtually all tax "policy" is revenue-driven, a 
multi-billion-dollar conservation stimulus should at least 
provide rational incentives. 
Before we offer a hypothetical situation to test the 
rationality of the Chafee proposal, we should note 
preliminarily that (1) the new estate tax break would 
apply, in effect, to the remaining value in property 
already reduced, for estate tax purposes, by the gift or 
bequest of a conservation easement, and (2) the statute 
does not distinguish between easements created before 
or after the enactment of the statute. For the thousands 
of taxpayers whose properties are appropriately lo-
cated and already protected in perpetuity by conserva-
tion easements, this statute will restore belief in Santa 
Claus. 
Now for the reality check. Edwina Blodgett is a 
75-year-old widow with a potential $6 million gross 
estate. Her holdings are liquid, and she faces a 55e;( 
federal estate tax on those assets exceeding $3 million 
in value. Further assume that any asset now held or 
newly acquired will appreciate 50Ck in value from 
today until the date of her death. 
First, suppose that Edwina purchases $2 million in 
securities. Those securities will be worth $3 million at 
her death, and will be subject to the maximum estate 
tax rate; i.e., her heirs will be left with just $1,350,000 
of the $3 million pre-tax value. If, however, she pur-
chases appropriately located land, with respect to which 
she can provide by bequest a "qualified conservation 
easement" reducing the value of that property by 30e;(, 
her gross estate will be doubly reduced - first by the 
deduction attributable to the conservation easement 
(IRC §2055(f); i.e., by $900,0(0), and then by the new 
exclusion (50e;( of the remaining value). Only 
$1,050,000 of the value of the easement-protected land 
will be subject to tax. The estate tax of $577,500 (55e;( 
of $1 ,050,0(0) leaves Edwina's heirs with $1,522,500 
of property value-$172,500 ahead of the securities-
investment plan. 
But the game is not yet over. Once Edwina real-
izes that she can do so well by doing good, she may 
surely be persuaded to create the qualifying conserva-
tion easement by inter vivos gift, thus layering income 
tax savings onto the already top-heavy tax-benefit plat-
ter. For a taxpayer subject to a maximum (federal! 
state) income tax rate of 45%, the income tax benefits 
attributable to a present gift of a 30e;( conservation 
easement over a property worth $2 million could ap-
proach $270,000 (45% of the value of the easement at 
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the date of the gift, presumed to be shortly after acqui-
sition of the property). 
Toting up the total governmental tax-expenditure 
costs of this remarkable opportunity, we find that 
$900,000 of presumed conservation value (measured 
by the appraised easement value as of the time of 
death) has been acquired at a total cost to the revenue 
of $1,342,500; to wit: 
Income tax savings 
Estate tax saving from 
exclusion of $900,000 
$ 270,000 
easement value $ 495,000 
Estate tax saving attributable 
to new exclusion $ 577,500 
Total "tax benefit" 
acquisition cost $1,342,000 
One must hope that the Conference Committee, which 
must reconcile the House and Senate bills (the House 
bill contains no counterpart to the Senate proposal) 
will not find in these computations any hint of rational 
policy. 
But perhaps we make too much of this; it may be a 
narrow, special-interest proposal, unlikely to be easily 
adapted to most estate plans. Hardly. The 25-mile 
geographical limitation would have applied to 254 "met-
ropolitan areas" as of mid-1994 (OMB Bulletin No. 
94-07, July 5, 1994). Areas of less than 100,000 
persons may be so designated; it is virtually certain 
that most of the eastern seaboard, substantial areas of 
the industrial Midwest, and most of California, includ-
ing the "Wine Country" counties, are so designated. 
With a stroke of the pen, all owners of presently pro-
tected properties in those areas will be the delighted 
beneficiaries of prospective estate tax savings totalling 
into the billions of dollars. 
As we go to press, this remarkable giveaway is 
evidently the subject of serious consideration by the 
Conference Committee. If it survives, and if the bill 
itself is not the victim of a Presidential veto (a not 
unlikely prospect), it is apt to force a dramatic reorien-
tation of land trust opportunities and priorities . Estate 
planners will henceforth drive the engines of local 
conservation programs, and God help the land trust 
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that proves itself not sufficiently malleable to adapt to 
the new climate. Estate planners will strive to create 
the perfect "30% conservation easement," since tax 
benefits will be maximized where a conservation ease-
ment reduces the value of the property by at least, but 
not much more than, 30%. And once the phenomenon 
is noticed by guardians of the fisc more attenti ve than 
the current Senate Finance Committee, itis likely to be 
legislated out of existence, along, perhaps, with the 
conservation easement baby that has briefly enjoyed 
the bath. 
Bad tax policy is bad tax policy, however benign 
the formative intentions. Yet the land trust community 
has made nary a peep about this potential fiscal atroc-
ity, and, in fact, the Board of Directors of the Land 
Trust Alliance formally supported a prior version of 
the Chafee bill, and has made no public renunciation of 
that misguided endorsement. In the short run, the en-
actment of this legislation will create a climate of 
greed and expediency, and in the long run may do 
fundamental damage to the cause of voluntary land 
preservation itself. 
--William T. Hutton 
September/October 1995 
